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THE END OF INNOCENCE? FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS LAW AFTER IN RE DAVIS 
Joshua M. Lott* 
INTRODUCTION 
“This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the 
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial 
but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ 
innocent.”1 Justice Scalia may already be well known for a strict 
approach to statutory construction, but his dissenting statement in the 
2009 Supreme Court decision, In re Davis, caused quite a buzz 
among national media.2 Although callous in appearance, Justice 
Scalia’s words provide a technically correct reading of Supreme 
Court precedent and federal habeas corpus law:3 actual innocence is 
not a recognized claim of constitutional error that would allow 
federal courts to review a prisoner’s habeas petition.4  
A majority of the justices, however, were convinced that Troy 
Davis, the petitioner, held new evidence so substantial that it 
warranted the Court’s rarely used “original” habeas jurisdiction.5 In 
granting his petition, the Court cleared the way for the federal 
evidentiary hearing that Mr. Davis’s lawyers and advocates had been 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks to Professor 
Anne Emanuel for her guidance and willingness to be a constant sounding board for my ideas. 
 1. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, Troy Davis Raises Death Penalty Questions, TIME, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917118,00.html; Josh Patashnik, The Troy Davis Case 
and Standards of Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/the-
troy-davis-case-and-standards-review; Bill Rankin, U.S. Supreme Court Orders New Hearing for Troy 
Davis, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/news/u-s-supreme-court-117260.html.   
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that federal habeas relief is barred unless the state 
court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as 
determined by the Supreme Court). 
 4. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered 
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.”) 
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963))).  
 5. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.  
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seeking for years.6 Justice Stevens, who wrote the Court’s only other 
opinion, stated in concurrence with the majority’s order that it was 
right to reject a line of reasoning that would theoretically justify the 
execution of a truly innocent person.7 The Court transferred Mr. 
Davis’s case to the district court for a determination of “whether 
evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly 
establishes [the] petitioner’s innocence.”8 Until this most recent 
Supreme Court decision, every state and federal body that reviewed 
Mr. Davis’s case had concluded that the evidence was not persuasive 
enough to justify a new trial, evidentiary hearing, or any conclusion 
other than the jury’s.9  
The story behind the Court’s extraordinary decision begins in 1989 
at a Burger King parking lot on a late August night in Savannah, 
Georgia.10 Mark MacPhail, an off-duty police officer, was working 
security for the restaurant when he ran outside after hearing a man 
scream for help.11 In the parking lot, three men surrounded Larry 
Young, who was bloodied and lying on the ground after a scuffle 
turned violent.12 As Officer MacPhail approached, shots were fired 
from a .38 caliber revolver, and he fell to the ground dead.13 When 
his body was found later, MacPhail’s gun was still in its holster, 
blood had filled his mouth, and bits of teeth were scattered along an 
adjacent sidewalk.14  
The tangled mess that followed is replete with murder mystery 
ambiguity: eyewitnesses with alleged motives to lie, questionable 
police identification procedures, ambiguous ballistics results from 
shell casings found at the scene, and an angry public traumatized by 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See generally Brief for Bob Barr et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re Davis, 130 S. 
Ct. 1 (2009) (No. 08-1443) [hereinafter Brief for Bob Barr et al.]; see also Bob Barr, Editorial, Death 
Penalty Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A21 [hereinafter Barr Death Penalty Editorial]. 
 7. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 8. Id.   
 9. Brief of Petitioner at 2, In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (No. 08-1443) [hereinafter Brief of 
Petitioner].  
 10. Id. at 2.  
 11. Id.   
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Brief of Respondent at 17, In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, (2009) (No. 08-1443) [hereinafter Brief of 
Respondent].  
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the loss of a public servant.15 In the end, nine eyewitnesses identified 
Troy Davis as the gunman.16 Despite his claim of innocence, Mr. 
Davis was convicted of malice murder, and on August 30, 1991, he 
was sentenced to death.17 To this day, Troy Davis has maintained his 
innocence; in fact, he continues to assert that Redd Coles, one of the 
State’s nine witnesses, fired the gun that ended Mark MacPhail’s 
life.18 After years of unsuccessful attempts, Mr. Davis’s defense team 
convinced the Supreme Court that his new evidence of innocence 
coupled with the recantations from seven of the eyewitnesses 
demanded a reexamination of his case.19  
Death penalty proponents and abolitionists,20 jurists and politicians 
across the political spectrum,21 and Troy Davis supporters22 all 
heralded the Supreme Court’s decision as an answer to their call for a 
more fair and flexible judiciary, but In re Davis actually invites 
serious doubt about such an assumption.23 Although the Court 
appears to acknowledge that a truly persuasive claim of actual 
innocence in a capital case exposes a gap in current law, Davis fails 
to provide a legitimate method to fill this gap.24 The substantive and 
procedural components of federal post-conviction law are aimed at 
ensuring limited judicial review and granting relief only when a state 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See generally id.; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9.  
 16. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 2.  
 17. Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 4 (citing Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993)).    
 18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 2.    
 19. Id. at 2–9. 
 20. See, e.g., Amnesty International USA, Troy Davis: Finality Over Fairness, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/troy-davis-finality-over-fairness/page.do?id=1011343 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2010); Barr Death Penalty Editorial, supra note 6 (“I am a firm believer in the death 
penalty, but I am an equally firm believer in the rights and protections guaranteed by the Constitution. 
To execute Troy Davis without having a court hear the evidence of his innocence would be 
unconscionable and unconstitutional.”).      
 21. Brief for Bob Barr et al., supra note 6 (listing twenty-seven different politicians, prosecutors, and 
members of the judiciary).   
 22. Amnesty International USA, supra note 20 (listing activists across the world who have joined in 
supporting Troy Davis). 
 23. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 (1993) (holding that petitioner must supplement his 
innocence evidence with a cognizable claim because actual innocence alone does not warrant habeas 
relief); see discussion infra Parts I.B.1, II.B.   
 24. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400–06. The Supreme Court has never decided the burden of proof 
required for habeas relief in a substantive claim of actual innocence. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2009) 
(mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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court judgment is unconstitutional.25 Indeed, without some other 
independent constitutional violation, post-conviction claims of 
factual innocence alone have never qualified as a basis for habeas 
relief.  
Under current law, Mr. Davis’s request for a federal evidentiary 
hearing should have been denied outright. The Court’s decision to 
bypass these statutory and constitutional requirements raises a 
multitude of questions in the ongoing debate over how capital 
punishment is administered and reviewed in the United States. With 
no majority opinion, however, and no guidance other than Justice 
Stevens’s hypothesis as to how lower courts, if persuaded, might 
circumvent the statutory language controlling habeas relief,26 the 
decision could possibly upset decades of precedent, federal law, and 
federalism principles.27 In the absence of such direction, In re Davis 
may be nothing more than a hollow attempt at reconciling a very 
serious moral crisis—one that potentially fails the victims in whose 
name capital punishment is justified, or worse, result in the execution 
of a truly innocent petitioner. Indeed, Judge William T. Moore, Jr., of 
Georgia’s Southern district, had the difficult task of unraveling these 
“innocence” ambiguities in Mr. Davis’s case. After hearing all the 
evidence in the much-anticipated June 2010 hearing, Judge Moore 
concluded that while actual innocence is a valid constitutional claim, 
Mr. Davis had failed to “clearly” establish his innocence.28   
                                                                                                                 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see also Sara Rodriguez & Scott J. Atlas, Habeas Corpus: The 
Dilemma of Actual Innocence, 34 LITIG. 35, 36 (Winter 2008) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus . . . [is] 
used by prisoners seeking ‘collateral review’ after completion of direct appeal. In this context, prisoners 
test the constitutionality of their convictions and sentences.”). 
 26. Justice Stevens’s concurrence is limited to a discussion of how the district court might still have 
power to grant relief. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring). It does not guide 
lower courts on how to arrive at a decision that relief is warranted. Id.; see also discussion infra Part 
II.D.2.  
 27. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 421 (“The question is a sensitive and . . . troubling one. It implicates not 
just the life of a single individual, but also the State’s powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the 
guilty, and the nature of state-federal relations.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also discussion infra 
Parts I.B–C.  
 28. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, slip op. at 109 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), 
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This Note has two primary purposes. The first is to examine the 
legal structure and policies behind actual innocence in the context of 
certain contemporary trends that have eroded public faith in the 
criminal justice system. The second purpose is to set forth a proposal 
that fills the aforementioned “innocence gap” and to justify the 
availability of a substantive innocence claim in a narrow class of 
death penalty cases.   
Part I explores the relevant history of habeas corpus in the United 
States and how In re Davis is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier 
actual innocence decisions.29 Part II examines the Davis Court’s 
reasoning as well as the legal and policy implications of the 
decision.30 Specifically, Part II analyzes the interplay between (1) the 
increasing public awareness of weaknesses existing in the criminal 
justice process, (2) the potential burdens of proof required to prove 
actual innocence at a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, (3) the 
problematic nature of recanting eyewitness testimony as evidence of 
innocence, and (4) the high level of deference given to state court 
judgments and the federal policy of judgment finality.31 In light of 
this analysis, Part III proposes that the Supreme Court should 
recognize that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution require judicial review of certain substantive actual 
innocence claims in the capital punishment context.32 Rather than 
relying on overly restrictive constructions of habeas corpus law, 
however, this proposal adopts Justice Blackmun’s “probably is 
innocent” framework from Herrera v. Collins33 as the basis for 
adjudicating innocence claims on the merits. This proposal serves as 
a limited exception to the otherwise valid statutory requirements 
found in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), the legislation that controls all federal habeas corpus 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See discussion infra Part I. Part I also includes a description of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the philosophical shift behind the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ 
treatment of habeas review. Id. 
 30. See infra Part II. The discussion includes the societal effect of DNA evidence and the exposure 
of wrongful convictions. Id.   
 31. See infra Parts II.A–D.  
 32. See infra Part III.A.  
 33. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  
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claims.34 Finally, Part III recommends that states should protect their 
finality interests and minimize federal intervention by addressing 
flaws within their own criminal systems.35 
I.  INNOCENCE AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LAW 
A.  Understanding the Modern Writ  
1.  Historical Foundation  
The writ of habeas corpus has a long history in English and 
American common law jurisprudence.36 Although traditionally used 
as a means of compelling officials to bring prisoners into court,37 the 
writ has expanded today into a complex set of procedural rules and is 
the primary method used to challenge the legality of one’s 
imprisonment.38  
In the American context, the writ of habeas corpus is rooted in the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which states that the writ 
“shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”39 The Suspension Clause 
serves as the basis for what the Court defines as its “original habeas 
jurisdiction.”40 However, a petitioner seeking issuance of the Court’s 
original writ rarely receives it because one must show that 
“exceptional circumstances” exist and that “relief cannot be obtained 
in any other form or from any other court.”41 Pursuant to these 
limitations, the habeas petitioner may file the writ in any branch of 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See discussion infra Parts I.C, III.B.  
 35. See infra Part III.C.       
 36. Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 36.  
 37. Id. at 36 (defining “grant of the writ” as shorthand for granting relief the petitioner has requested 
if the restraints are found to be illegal). 
 38. Id.  
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
 40. SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a).  
 41. SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a) (stating that an original writ shall be issued only in the truly exceptional 
case); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.) (acknowledging that the Court’s original writ power had 
not been used in almost fifty years). 
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the federal judiciary, but the normal practice is that determinations 
are made in the appropriate district court.42  
Beyond the rarely issued “original” writ, the Supreme Court lacks 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims through Article III.43 Instead, 
Congress, through its own constitutional power over the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Court, maintains wide discretion over the rules and 
procedures governing habeas practice.44 In fact, federal courts could 
only consider claims by federal prisoners until 1867—the year 
Congress expanded habeas jurisdiction to include all cases and 
persons restrained “in violation of the constitution.”45 However, post-
conviction collateral attacks by state prisoners were not fully 
included in this expanded constitutional framework until the 1960s. 
During this era, the Warren Court greatly expanded the scope of the 
writ as a means of striking down unconstitutional state criminal 
procedures and laws.46 While these actions provided defendants 
greater access to justice on a variety of newly recognized grounds, 
critics feared that federal courts would be overwhelmed by frivolous 
claims from state prisoners.47 
2.  Habeas Corpus and Verdict Accuracy    
In response to what was viewed as “abuse of the writ,”48 the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts restricted the availability of habeas 
                                                                                                                 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 44. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.  
 45. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659–60 n.2 
(1996) (citing the few exceptions where state prisoners were allowed to obtain the writ).  
 46. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and 
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 587, 591, 609–10 (2005). The Warren Court was largely guided by the idea that the 
criminal process should be improved with additional federal review, which resulted in the creation of 
new cognizable claims for habeas petitioners. Id. 
 47. Id. at 609. The Court expressed fear that expansion of the writ would lead to an increase in the 
total number of petitions, tying up judicial resources such that the habeas petitioner in true need of 
federal relief would not have meaningful review. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a 
flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude 
that the needle is not worth the search.”).     
 48. The “abuse of the writ” doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that limits a prisoner’s ability to 
bring a successive or previously litigated claim. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial 
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corpus relief in several ways.49 In a series of decisions, the Court 
moved away from overturning state judgments solely because of 
government misconduct or incompetent defense counsel.50 Instead, 
the Court defined the individual right to a fair trial by focusing on the 
accuracy of the original verdict; thus, despite constitutional error, 
“unfairness” worthy of habeas relief hinged on whether the guilty 
verdict remained reliable.51  
As “verdict accuracy” gained momentum, the Court also became 
receptive to the habeas reform ideas espoused by Judge Henry 
Friendly, who first introduced the idea of actual innocence.52 To 
combat habeas abuses, Judge Friendly stated that “with a few 
important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral 
attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea 
with a colorable claim of actual innocence.”53 Judge Friendly’s 
proposal essentially relegated “innocence” into a post-conviction 
procedural mechanism because it required petitioners to show new 
innocence evidence plus a constitutional violation before evidentiary 
                                                                                                                 
Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to 
Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 75, 89 (2005). The doctrine was strengthened by the Court during this era and codified in 1966 and 
1976 amendments to the federal habeas statute. See id. at 89 n.96. The Court placed even more 
restrictions through abuse of the writ in the Rehnquist era. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 
(1991).  
 49. See cases cited infra notes 50–51.   
 50. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (holding that convictions should 
remain undisturbed even where a petitioner can prove that his attorney fell below the reasonable 
competence standard unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome was undermined); Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976) (stating that no rights in federal habeas are created in 
evidentiary and Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure issues because they are expected to be litigated 
in a state court at trial); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 613 (“The Court defined ‘prejudice’ . . . as 
‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different,’ noting that ‘[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.’”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).  
 51. See cases cited supra note 50; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (noting that 
the purpose of federal habeas is not to retry the facts of the case); Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 
(1977) (stating that a state criminal trial is the ultimate event in deciding issues of innocence and guilt); 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 610 (“[T]he Court’s preclusion of ‘new’ constitutional claims on 
federal habeas, like its tightened procedural rules, allowed only narrow exceptions, the most significant 
of which concerned issues related to verdict accuracy.”). 
 52. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).   
 53. Id. at 142. For a fuller understanding of Judge Friendly’s influence on the Court see Steiker & 
Steiker, supra note 46, at 609–12.  
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hearings could even be granted.54 Although this actual innocence 
concept placed a heavier burden on state prisoners, the Court 
believed Judge Friendly’s ideas struck the proper balance between 
the state’s interest in judgment finality, individual rights, and abuses 
in the federal habeas system.55       
3.  The Procedural Default Doctrine and Actual Innocence 
By embracing policies that emphasized the state trial as the 
ultimate determination of a defendant’s guilt, the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts also restricted the procedural limitations of habeas 
corpus law.56 For example, the procedural default doctrine bars all 
constitutional claims from being heard in federal court if they have 
already been denied in state habeas proceedings.57 Conversely, the 
doctrine also requires the petitioner to raise all constitutional claims 
in state court before raising them in federal court or risk having those 
claims barred in the federal proceeding as well.58 Thus, procedurally 
defaulted claims are completely foreclosed to federal review with 
only a few exceptions.59  
To overcome the bar on procedurally defaulted claims a prisoner 
must demonstrate “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 
result of the alleged violation of federal law.”60 Within the default 
doctrine, however, the Court created a “fundamental miscarriage of 
justice” exception to the cause-and-prejudice requirement, for which 
actual innocence serves in its limited procedural role.61 Essentially, 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 610.  
 55. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1993) (discussing the deference given to 
state court judgments); Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 35 (“Federal habeas corpus procedures 
(and, often, state habeas procedures) closely reflect the views of Justice Jackson and Judge Friendly.”); 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 609–10.     
 56. See cases cited supra notes 50–51; Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 36. 
 57. Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 38.    
 58. Id. (“[T]he “exhaustion [of claims] requirement ‘reflects a policy of federal-state comity.’” 
(citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971))).    
 59. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 610.   
 60. Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 38 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 
(1991)). 
 61. Id. (“The ‘fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice’ exception to the finality rule . . . can be satisfied 
only by . . . new, reliable evidence that the prisoner is actually innocent of the underlying offense [as 
well as constitutional error] or . . . that he is actually innocent for purposes of the punishment of death as 
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any prisoner seeking federal habeas review must file a claim that 
alleges a cognizable constitutional error, explain the cause for why it 
was not filed in state court, and explain the prejudice that will occur 
if a federal court chooses not to hear it.62 If the prisoner cannot meet 
the cause-and-prejudice requirement, he must present a compelling 
case of actual innocence: facts not available at the time of trial to 
show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur.63 If actual 
innocence is proven, then the defaulted constitutional claims will be 
decided on their merits at an evidentiary hearing.64 Thus, in creating 
these exceptions, the Court officially incorporated actual innocence 
into federal habeas corpus for the procedural purpose advocated by 
Judge Friendly.65 However, the Court did not define the required 
burden of proof for a showing of actual innocence, nor did it resolve 
the question of whether actual innocence was itself an independent 
constitutional claim until Herrera v. Collins66 and Schlup v. Delo.67 
B.  The Two Meanings of Actual Innocence: Substantive and 
Procedural  
1.  Actual Innocence is Not a Substantive Claim Under Herrera 
In Herrera, the Court was asked to decide whether actual 
innocence was a cognizable and independent constitutional claim that 
would entitle a habeas petitioner to relief.68 The petitioner, Leonel 
                                                                                                                 
the result of an error that occurred at his sentencing.” (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324–25 
(1995))).   
 62. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 610 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) 
(excuse for petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedural rule must meet “cause and prejudice” 
standard rather than “deliberate bypass” standard of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963))); Keeney v. 
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (applying cause and prejudice standard to failure to develop the facts 
underlying claim and overruling Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 
467 (1991) (applying cause and prejudice standard to new claims not presented in previous petition); 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (applying cause and prejudice standard to successive claims 
raising grounds identical to grounds heard and decided on the merits in a previous petition)).   
 63. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 38.    
 64. See Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 39.  
 65. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494–95, (1991)); see 
also Friendly, supra note 52.  
 66. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  
 67. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).   
 68. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393.  
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Herrera, was sentenced to death in January 1982 after he was found 
guilty of murder.69 After spending ten years navigating state and 
federal habeas procedures, he brought a second federal habeas 
petition in federal court claiming that he was “actually innocent” of 
the murder.70 The petition did not allege trial error nor did it allege 
past constitutional violations.71 Instead, Mr. Herrera’s claim stated 
that his future execution would prospectively violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.72 Mr. 
Herrera’s new evidence consisted of witness affidavits indicating his 
deceased brother was the actual gunman.73 Because actual innocence 
was not independently cognizable, the lower circuit court declined 
Mr. Herrera’s request for an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
reliability of the affidavits.74 In affirming the circuit court’s decision, 
the Supreme Court not only dismissed the affidavits as unreliable75 
but also held that a substantive claim of actual innocence based on 
newly discovered post-trial evidence is not cognizable; federal habeas 
relief can only be granted when an independent constitutional 
violation occurred at the state criminal proceeding.76 The Court 
reiterated that actual innocence is a procedural mechanism under the 
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the procedural 
default rule.77  
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.    
 71. Id.  
 72. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).  
 73. Id. at 393. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 417–18 (“Petitioner’s affidavits are particularly suspect . . . . No satisfactory explanation 
has been given as to why the affiants waited until the 11th hour . . . after the alleged perpetrator of the 
murders himself was dead—to make their statements.”).     
 76. Id. at 416 (“Federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of 
constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceedings. Our 
federal habeas cases have treated claims of ‘actual innocence,’ not as an independent constitutional 
claim . . . considered on the merits . . . .”). 
 77. Id. at 404 (“[T]his body of our habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual 
innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner 
must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”); see supra Part 
I.A.3. 
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The Court was particularly wary of the “disruptive effect” that a 
so-called “freestanding actual innocence claim” would have on the 
need for finality in state court judgments.78 The majority believed 
that a fact-finder with newly proffered evidence is actually in a worse 
position than the original fact-finder because the passage of time has 
a corrosive effect on evidence and witness testimony.79 Thus, the 
Court stated that a new hearing could not be a more accurate and 
reliable determination of truth than the original.80 Furthermore, the 
Court believed that society has a large degree of faith in the 
legitimacy of criminal trials because the Constitution offers 
“unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”81 The 
Court confirmed its view that federal habeas courts do not exist to re-
litigate state trials but instead are intended to free persons held in 
violation of the constitution.82 Nevertheless, the Court assumed 
arguendo that a “truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ 
[in a capital case] . . . would render the execution of a defendant 
unconstitutional” but did not expressly hold so because such a case 
must first pass an “extraordinarily high” initial showing not present in 
Herrera.83 
2.  Burden of Proof Required for Procedural “Actual Innocence” 
Under Schlup 
Two years later in Schlup v. Delo, the Court further refined the 
procedural role of actual innocence in federal habeas proceedings.84 
The Schlup majority upheld its previous decision, finding that 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403–07, 414 (1993) (stating that federal habeas courts are not 
intended to correct errors of fact, thus substantial deference is given to the states in criminal proceedings 
because of their expertise in matters of criminal procedure and process). 
 79. Id. at 403–04 (“[W]hen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the ‘erosion of 
memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time’ prejudice the government and 
diminish the chances of reliable criminal adjudication.” (quoting McKlesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 
(1991))).  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 82. Id. at 400 (“This rule is grounded on the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that 
individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”). 
 83. Id. at 417.  
 84. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).  
12
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innocence should only be considered under the fundamental 
miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine.85 
Schlup then provided the procedural actual innocence analysis for 
courts to use when deciding whether barred claims should be heard. 
The Schlup test balances the innocence evidence against the 
reliability of the state’s verdict to determine “whether it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole 
would lack reasonable doubt.”86 Thus, if the “probable” test is met, a 
federal habeas petitioner may have an otherwise barred constitutional 
claim considered on the merits.87 However, in subsequent cases the 
Court has held that the Schlup test is a lower standard than what 
would be hypothetically required for the “extraordinarily high” 
substantive actual innocence Herrera claim.88  
C.  The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
1.  Congressional Restrictions on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Despite the already narrow limits placed on habeas corpus 
procedure by the Court, Congress further restricted habeas relief by 
passing the Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), which applies to all habeas claims in federal court.89 
Formulated in the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, 
the Act restricts procedural time limits, a petitioner’s ability to file 
successive claims, and the instances where state judgments can be 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 326–27.  
 86. Id. at 327. 
 87. See Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 38. The Court recently discussed this test in House v. 
Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). House was convicted and sentenced to death for aggravated sexual assault 
and murder. Id. at 521. In his federal habeas corpus petition, he raised a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel because it was procedurally barred under state law. Id. at 534. Mr. House attempted to use 
Schlup to overcome his defaulted claim because he obtained new DNA evidence as well as evidence that 
the victim’s spouse was the murderer. Id. at 553. The Court held that he met the “probable” standard, 
and his case was remanded to the district court to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Id. at 554–55. 
 88. See House, 547 U.S. at 536–40, 555; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993); see also 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (creating an actual innocence procedural default gateway of 
“clear and convincing” proof indicating ineligibility for the death penalty).  
 89. Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1217–1226 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
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overturned.90 Significantly, it “borrowed from and exaggerated the 
Court’s use of innocence as a gateway”91 by reserving relief for “only 
[the] truly grievous constitutional wrongs.”92 In direct contrast to 
Schlup’s probable standard, § 2254(e)(2)(B) denies a petitioner 
access to an evidentiary hearing unless they can “establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no 
reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense.”93 Section 2254(e)(1) states that determinations 
made by a state court “shall be presumed to be correct” and can only 
be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.94 Furthermore, the 
Act provides for innocence evidence only of the underlying offense to 
be considered in relief determinations, which nullified the Court’s 
“innocence of the aggravating circumstances” death sentence 
ineligibility claim.95 The AEDPA’s re-calibration of habeas corpus 
law is reflective of the larger verdict accuracy movement of the time, 
a philosophy that continues to guide the Court, and one that ensures a 
                                                                                                                 
 90. The AEDPA requires that any claim in a successive petition be barred if the factual predicate for 
the claim could have been discovered during the exercise of due diligence, including actual innocence 
procedural claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). The Act restricted the right to file claims by 
requiring challenges to state convictions be filed in federal court within one year of “the date on which 
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 
such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006); see Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 39 (noting 
that the AEDPA’s demand for quick review of constitutional error enhances the accuracy of state court 
judgments by “‘requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh’ and lends 
‘finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time’” (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 
205–06 (2006))). For a more complete discussion of the many ways that the AEDPA limited a 
petitioner’s ability to file second claims and receive relief see Entzeroth, supra note 48.  
 91. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 611.  
 92. Id. at 610.  
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2000). The Court later distinguished § 2254(e)(2) from the Schlup 
“probable innocence” standard stating that Schlup applies to the first procedurally defaulted habeas 
petition and “clear and convincing” evidence applies to successive petitions. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 
518, 539, 554 (2006).   
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).  
 95. The AEDPA purports to eliminate Sawyer. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); Sawyer v. 
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (holding that ineligibility for the death penalty can be shown by clear 
and convincing innocence evidence of the aggravating circumstances); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, 
at 611 (“Congress, like the Court, crafted an ‘innocence’ exception—but limited it to claims of factual 
innocence of the underlying offense (rather than ineligibility for the death penalty, as the Court 
permitted) . . . .”). But see Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
AEDPA abrogated collateral attack of ineligibility of a death sentence only for successive habeas 
petitions).    
14
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maximum amount of deference to trial judgments.96 Many critics 
have noted that societal values such as dignity, fairness, and equality 
are secondary considerations under current law.97   
2.  Interpreting the Constitutionality of the AEDPA 
In Felker v. Turpin, the Court considered whether it had the ability 
to review an Eleventh Circuit decision that denied the successive 
petition of a Georgia death row inmate.98 The Felker petitioner 
claimed that the AEDPA amounted to an unconstitutional suspension 
of the writ because § 2244 completely repealed the Supreme Court’s 
review power.99 The Court upheld the amended section in question 
finding that it only applied to successive petitions rather than the 
Court’s original habeas power.100 In reference to the AEDPA’s 
control over the Court’s original authority, the Court stated, 
“[w]hether or not we are bound by these restrictions, they certainly 
inform our consideration of original habeas petitions.”101 
While some of the Act’s provisions explicitly apply to successive 
petitions, many of them purport to constrain all of the federal 
judiciary—including the Supreme Court’s original habeas 
jurisdiction. For example, § 2254(d)(1), which is disputed in Davis, 
only allows federal courts to provide habeas relief for state prisoners 
if the state’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court.”102 Additionally, in House v. Bell, a 2006 decision, 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 612.  
 97. See id. at 612–14. Unless the petitioner is sentenced to death, there is no right to counsel in 
habeas corpus proceedings. Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 37; But see infra notes 135–41 and 
accompanying text; Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 41 (“[V]irtually every inmate convicted of a 
capital or noncapital crime is indigent . . . more than 90 percent of [habeas] petitioners litigate[] their 
cases without counsel or [are] represented by court-appointed counsel, and most are poorly educated.”).  
 98. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–62 (1996).  
 99. Id. at 658.  
 100. Id. at 660–61.  
 101. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).  
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a)–(d)(1) (2006). Section 2254 begins with an explicit reference to “The 
Supreme Court,” thus affirming Justice Scalia’s position in Davis that the majority has acted outside the 
explicit language of the statute because the state court has not violated any clearly established federal 
law in denying Mr. Davis a new trial. § 2254 (a)–(d)(1); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Schlup’s “more likely than not” standard was at issue, and a divided 
Court found that “clear and convincing evidence” is required only in 
successive habeas petitions.103 Whether and to what extent other 
AEDPA restrictions constrain the Court’s original habeas power 
remains unclear.104  
D.  Applying Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures to Troy Davis 
In the legal and factual sense, understanding In re Davis requires 
“navigating [the] AEDPA’s thicket of procedural brambles.”105 
However, it necessarily illustrates the extraordinary impact that the 
decision may have on federal law.106 Mr. Davis’s first federal petition 
raised a series of constitutional violations not included in his prior 
habeas petitions before the Georgia state courts.107 These claims 
included: (1) that the prosecution knowingly admitted false evidence 
at trial,108 (2) that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence,109 and (3) that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective.110 Mr. Davis sought to overcome the procedural default 
rule by submitting the affidavits from recanting witnesses as actual 
innocence evidence under Schlup.111 However, rather than ruling on 
the merits of the Schlup claim, the district court decided the merits of 
the constitutional claims instead and denied Mr. Davis’s request for 
an evidentiary hearing.112  
Subsequently, Mr. Davis filed an extraordinary motion for new 
trial in Georgia, which was denied at the trial level and then appealed 
                                                                                                                 
 103. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
 104. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996)). 
 105. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).   
 106. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. Troy Davis was granted habeas relief in the form of an 
evidentiary hearing, even though he raised the hypothetical freestanding actual innocence claim that the 
Court denied in Herrera. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 
(1993).   
 107. Davis, 565 F.3d at 813 (11th Cir. 2009).  
 108. Id. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  
 109. Davis, 565 F.3d at 813. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
 110. Davis, 565 F.3d at 813. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 111. Davis, 565 F.3d at 813. Mr. Davis sought to use the recanting witnesses as actual innocence 
evidence to have his otherwise barred constitutional claims considered on their merits. See discussion 
supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2. 
 112. Davis, 565 F.3d at 813. 
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to the Georgia Supreme Court.113 In affirming, the court opined about 
the inherent unreliability of witness recantations and noted that 
original trial testimony “is closer in time to the crime, when 
memories are more trustworthy . . . lend[ing] special credibility to 
trial testimony.”114 The court concluded by stating that it had 
“endeavored to look beyond bare legal principles” in rendering its 
decision as to whether, in light of the new evidence, a new jury 
would “probably find [Mr. Davis] not guilty or give him a sentence 
other than death . . . . We simply cannot disregard the [original] 
jury’s verdict in this case.”115     
Mr. Davis then filed a successive federal habeas petition with the 
Eleventh Circuit.116 Because all of his constitutional claims were 
denied in the first federal petition, Mr. Davis raised, for the first time, 
the hypothetical Herrera actual innocence claim.117 Rather than 
deciding the merits of this “freestanding actual innocence” claim, the 
circuit court based its decision on the narrower inquiry of whether the 
claim was procedurally barred by the AEDPA.118 The court held that 
the claim was barred because (1) Mr. Davis satisfied neither of the 
two requirements in § 2244 that govern the procedural default 
doctrine in successive petitions, (2) the petition did not contain any 
cognizable constitutional claim, and (3) even if the petition met the 
constitutional requirement, Mr. Davis’s innocence evidence could not 
possibly meet a “clear and convincing” evidentiary threshold.119  
                                                                                                                 
 113. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354 (2008). The right to file the motion for new trial is found at GA. 
CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (2008).    
 114. Davis, 660 S.E.2d at 358.  
 115. Id. at 362–63. The court also explicitly stated that it “favored” the original testimony over the 
new. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 116.  In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that a circuit court must give 
permission to a petitioner to file a successive claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2006).  
 117. Davis, 565 F.3d at 816–17.    
 118. Id. at 817 (“[T]he only question we face is whether Davis can bring such a claim in a second . . . 
petition. Because it is undisputed that [his] current application does not rely on a new rule of 
constitutional law . . . [he] must satisfy the two procedural requirements embodied in § 2244(b)(2)(B) in 
order to bring a Herrera claim now.”). 
 119. Id. at 819–22. Mr. Davis failed to show cause for not filing the Herrera substantive actual 
innocence claim in the first habeas petition because the court found that the innocence evidence used for 
Schlup procedural default purposes was substantially the same in both petitions. Id. at 822–24. Mr. 
Davis also failed to show that barring the Herrera actual innocence claim would result in a 
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” because the Schlup actual innocence factual inquiry could not be 
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In a final opportunity before his execution, Mr. Davis filed an 
original writ of habeas corpus in the United States Supreme Court.120 
Although unused in almost fifty years, the Court exercised its original 
power to grant Mr. Davis the requested relief of an evidentiary 
hearing.121 On August 17, 2009, his case was transferred to Judge 
William T. Moore of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Georgia to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to 
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of 
trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.”122   
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Davis focused on (1) the fact that 
“‘no court,’ state or federal, ‘has ever conducted a hearing to assess 
the reliability of the . . . affidavits’” from the recanting witnesses,123 
and (2) the possibility that § 2254(d)(1) may still provide relief for 
Mr. Davis.124 In his dissent, however, Justice Scalia noted that the 
Georgia Supreme Court could not have unreasonably applied a 
federal law that “the [U.S.] Supreme Court has not once accepted as 
valid.”125 
With little to go on other than the order itself, Judge Moore noted 
in his August 2010 opinion the strange and uncharted position in 
which he was placed.126 In the expansive 172-page opinion, Judge 
Moore held that executing an innocent man would indeed violate the 
Constitution, but he also ruled that Troy Anthony Davis “is not 
innocent.”127 It remains unclear to whom Davis’s lawyers must 
address an appeal of the order, but the Supreme Court may once 
                                                                                                                 
proven by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 826; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text 
(explaining that Schlup requires a heightened review in successive habeas petitions). 
 120. See generally Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9.   
 121. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Byrnes v. Walker, 371 
U.S. 937 (1962)).   
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (quoting In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (2009)). 
 124. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 101. 
 125. Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 126. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, slip op. at 1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/blog/2010/08/24/innocence-claim rejected/?utm_source= 
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+scotusblog%2FpFXs+%28SCOTUSblog%
29. 
 127. Id. at 109. 
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again expound on the viability of “freestanding actual innocence” 
claims in light of Judge Moore’s opinion.128    
II.  ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE AFTER IN RE DAVIS 
A.  Recognizing Substantive Actual Innocence Claims—Why Now? 
The Supreme Court decision in Davis is historic. It is the first 
stand-alone innocence claim to ever pass the hypothetical 
“extraordinarily high” threshold assumed to exist in Herrera v. 
Collins.129 Even more extraordinary is that Herrera was decided 
before Congress passed the AEDPA. According to the Act’s text, any 
requested relief, including an evidentiary hearing, is barred if a state’s 
decision is consistent with established federal law.130 Why would the 
Court allow Mr. Davis this hearing? Perhaps more importantly, did it 
serve any legitimate purpose?131  
Several cultural developments have eroded the public’s faith in the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, and they challenge the belief 
espoused by Justice O’Connor in Herrera—that the Constitution’s 
offer of “unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent” are 
an effective deterrent against wrongful convictions.132 Less than ten 
years after Herrera, in a sense of irony that only time can bring, 
Justice O’Connor stated in a widely publicized speech that “serious 
questions are being raised” over the unchecked ability of states to 
administer the death penalty; “the system may well be allowing 
innocent defendants to be executed.”133 This evolving cultural 
                                                                                                                 
 128. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 816 (2009). 
 129. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); see supra text accompanying note 17. 
 130. BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
LITIGATION § 3:50 (Thomson West 2008) (noting that if “federal law is not clearly established at the 
time of the state court adjudication, § 2254(d)(1) bars habeas relief” (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 412 (2000))).  
 131. One prevailing issue is whether the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision to deny Troy Davis’s 
extraordinary motion for new trial is so similar to a legal determination of a freestanding actual 
innocence claim that it would bar relief. See MEANS, supra note 130, at § 10:21 (“[F]ederal courts are 
bound to follow the decisions of the state’s highest court on state law matters. But absent controlling 
state precedent, federal courts must predict how the state’s highest court would decide the issue.” 
(citation omitted)).    
 132. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying notes 142–47. 
 133. Op-Ed., Justice O’Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A16. 
19
Lott: The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In re Davis
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2 
 
462
realization carries special weight in capital cases because “[n]othing 
could be more shocking to the conscience . . . than to execute a 
person who is actually innocent.”134 
The number of incarcerated prisoners in the United States has 
increased from 333,000 in the early 1970s to over 2,000,000 today.135 
As the number of incarcerated has increased, the public defender 
systems of many states have struggled to adequately cope with the 
sheer volume of cases and funding required to provide adequate legal 
counsel.136 These strains have led to lower pay and morale, excessive 
caseloads, and very high turnover rates.137 Out of deference to trial 
judgments and because of restrictive post-conviction procedures, 
judges have even upheld death sentences where attorneys slept 
through trial, admitted to drunkenness in court, or were otherwise 
ignorant of the law governing their case.138 However, ineffective 
counsel and underfunded public defender systems are not the only 
contributors.  
Police and prosecutorial misconduct exacerbate what one 
commentator refers to as our system of “finality without fairness.”139 
In 2003, former Illinois Governor George Ryan famously commuted 
the death sentences of all 163 Illinois death row inmates after 
discovering that detectives on Chicago’s South Side had tortured, 
suffocated, and beat the confessions out of three prisoners awaiting 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 135. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral 
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 340 (2006).  
 136. Id. at 342–43 (stating that the increased number of prosecutions and prisoners with long-term or 
death sentences has overwhelmed many public defender systems, which makes them unable to provide 
adequate defense representation).    
 137. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL pp. 52–70 (2009), available at 
http://tcpjusticedeniedwww.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf 
 138. Stevenson, supra note 135, at 345 nn.23–24 (citing Guy v. Cockrell, No. 01-10425, 2002 WL 
32785533, at *4 (5th Cir. July 23, 2002) (trial counsel conceded using drugs throughout capital trial); 
Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 377–78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (affirming death sentence even though 
trial had to be suspended for a day because lawyer appointed to represent defendant was too drunk to go 
forward); Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (upholding death sentence when 
lead attorney slept through major portions of trial); Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting) (denying death row prisoner’s application for post-conviction relief 
when lead trial attorney slept during trial)).   
 139. Stevenson, supra note 135, at 345. 
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execution.140 In defending his controversial move, Governor Ryan 
stated that “[o]ur capital system is haunted by the demon of error: 
error in determining guilt and error in determining who among the 
guilty deserves to die.”141 
DNA evidence has emerged as a crucial exculpatory tool for 
vindicating the wrongfully convicted. In the last two decades, 
Innocence Projects have used DNA to identify and release 242 
innocent prisoners,142 which yields valuable information for 
researchers to understand weaknesses within the criminal system.143 
Most significantly, DNA research has highlighted systemic 
challenges facing state public defender systems,144 the fragility of 
eyewitness identification evidence and procedure,145 and police and 
prosecutorial misconduct.146 These findings continue to serve as a 
major catalyst for reform in many states.147  
                                                                                                                 
 140. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at L1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/national/12DEAT.html.  
 141. Id.  
 142. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, FACT SHEET, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ 
351PRINT.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).  
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 137, at 51–60. In 2009, thirty-seven states 
faced a budget crisis and several were forced to make significant cuts in their public defender programs. 
Id. In addition to the forced closing of a major public defender center in 2008 for budget reasons, the 
Public Defender Standards Council in Georgia was also forced to lay off over forty employees because 
attorneys representing indigent capital clients could not be paid otherwise. Id. For a state-by-state 
breakdown of public defender budget woes, see id.  
 145. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 142. Three quarters of all DNA exonerations in the United 
States involve eyewitness misidentifications. Id. Many of these misidentifications involve cross-racial 
identification, lending support to research that shows people have difficulty recognizing the faces of 
people outside their own race. Id.   
 146. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 137, at 45. Some states have reformed their crime 
labs, others require mandatory videotaping of police interrogations or focus on prosecutorial 
misconduct, and almost all have adopted laws allowing prisoners to request post-conviction DNA 
testing. Shawn Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses: Why the Red-Headed Stepchild of New 
Evidence Deserves Another Look, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 75, 77 (2008); THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
supra note 142.  
 147. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 142. New Jersey and North Carolina have adopted 
eyewitness reform statutes, while Maryland, Georgia, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia have 
proposed statutory reform. Id. In 2008, the Georgia House of Representatives adopted a resolution with 
the express goal of implementing scientific protocol in police department eyewitness procedures to 
promote consistency, accuracy, and reliability in eyewitness identifications. See H.R. 352, 150th Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008); John Terzano, Study of Georgia’s Wrongfully Convicted Highlights 
Powerful Need for Reform, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-terzano/study-of-georgias-wrongfu_b_294568.html. Like many 
states, “contamination” of eyewitness evidence is Georgia’s number one cause for wrongful convictions, 
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The exposure of wrongful convictions directly calls into question 
the policy of “finality and judicial economy”148 that governs current 
habeas corpus law. If Davis is the potential springboard for habeas 
reform, however, simply allowing a state petitioner with a stand-
alone innocence claim to access a federal habeas court does not 
address whether meaningful review is possible. The Court’s 
statement that no court, “state or federal, ‘has ever conducted a 
hearing to assess the reliability” of the evidence, indicates that the 
Justices may not have been so much concerned with how Mr. Davis 
must prove his innocence, as with ensuring that due process affords 
him the opportunity to try.149 Although the In re Davis and Herrera 
Courts found it unnecessary to explain how a freestanding innocence 
claim could be decided on the merits, providing a standard of review 
differing from “the principle that habeas relief should be denied 
whenever possible” has consequences for the credibility of the writ 
and the life of any wrongfully convicted prisoner.150  
B.  Defining an Evidentiary Standard of Proof for Substantive Actual 
Innocence Claims  
1.  Petitioner Probably Is Innocent 
In Herrera, the Court stated that a hypothetical substantive 
innocence claim would require a “truly persuasive demonstration” to 
                                                                                                                 
and research shows that eyewitnesses must be handled the same way as other forms of physical 
evidence. Id.   
 148. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 88 n.70.  
 149. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring); see Brief of Petitioner, supra 
note 9, at 31 (“In the rare case of seven recantations, four of whom were innocent bystanders, four 
confessions from Redd Coles and at least one new eyewitness implicating Coles as the shooter, the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that Mr. Davis have an evidentiary hearing to prove that he 
is innocent.”).   
 150. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 439 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also 
stated in Herrera that it should be expected of states to adopt procedures to consider claims of actual 
innocence. Id. This raises the likelihood that the Court did not consider Mr. Davis’s extraordinary 
motion for new trial in Georgia to be an actual innocence hearing. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, 
II.D.1; see also MEANS, supra note 130, at § 11:48 (noting that federal prisoners who file a motion for 
new trial that argues actual innocence, rather than new evidence of a constitutional violation, is not 
considered as barred for the purpose of a later habeas filing).   
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show that a petitioner’s execution would be unconstitutional.151 The 
majority did not elaborate, but Justice Blackmun’s dissent not only 
recognized substantive actual innocence as a constitutional claim, it 
also provided an analytical framework for habeas courts to use.152   
Justice Blackmun stated that to receive relief on the merits, the 
petitioner with a substantive actual innocence claim “must show that 
he probably is innocent.”153 This standard differs from the Schlup 
probable standard in two important ways. First, Schlup is a 
procedural claim that provides the passageway for other barred 
constitutional claims to be considered on their merits at an 
evidentiary hearing,154 whereas actual innocence under Blackmun’s 
standard is the constitutional claim.155 The procedural default 
doctrine is not applicable because a “petitioner [that shows] he is 
entitled to relief on the merits . . . certainly can show that he falls 
within the ‘actual-innocence’ exception” to the default rule, and 
would therefore also be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.156 Second, 
Schlup is a verdict accuracy inquiry that requires the fact-finder to 
consider all of the evidence and determine whether it is probable that 
any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.157 If that burden is 
met, then a hearing is granted to decide the merits of the other 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (majority opinion); see discussion supra Part I.B.1.   
 152. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 441–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 442. 
 154. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–40 (2006); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 328–29 (1995); 
discussion supra Part I.B.2.  
 155. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 442–44 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I believe that if a 
prisoner can show that he is probably actually innocent . . . then he has made a ‘truly persuasive 
demonstration,’ and his execution would violate the Constitution.”).   
 156. Id. at 441. Herrera was decided two years before the actual innocence test in Schlup was 
articulated. At the time of Herrera, the procedural test required the petitioner to show “a fair probability 
. . . that the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 442 (citing Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455 n.17 (1986)). Both the Schlup test and Justice Blackmun’s proposal are 
higher burdens than the old Kuhlmann “fair” test. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328–29; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 
443. Thus, this explains why Justice Blackmun asserts that once a petitioner shows that he is entitled to 
relief on the substantive actual innocent claim, the procedural default rule is easily overcome. Herrera, 
506 U.S. at 441. 
 157. House, 547 U.S. at 538 (explaining that Schlup is not an inquiry into whether the government 
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather one that requires the “federal court 
to assess how reasonable jurors would react overall [to the] newly supplemented record” (citing Schlup 
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 328–29 (1995))); see also Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 38 (noting that 
newly discovered innocence evidence under Schlup is used to cast doubt on the reliability of the 
verdict).   
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constitutional claims, which have their own stringent evidentiary 
burdens.158 Conversely, Justice Blackmun’s “probably is innocent” 
standard also considers the entire evidentiary record, but whether the 
new evidence sufficiently undermines the reliability of the verdict is 
not its primary concern.159 Instead, the court is required to “weigh the 
evidence in favor of the prisoner against the evidence of his guilt” on 
a case-by-case basis.160 “[T]he stronger the evidence of . . . guilt, the 
more persuasive the newly discovered evidence must be.”161 Relief is 
granted once the petitioner meets the burden, and such action is 
justified because the execution of an innocent is unconstitutional.162   
Justice Blackmun’s proposal is the only Supreme Court opinion 
that provides a determinative analysis for freestanding actual 
innocence claims.163 It recognizes that prisoners “retain[] a powerful 
and legitimate interest” in relief even after a constitutionally valid 
trial.164 The “probably is innocent” test is not only an explicit 
rejection of actual innocence as a procedural default mechanism but 
also an admonishment of the Court’s unfairly limited view of habeas 
relief.165 Additionally, the proposal balances the individual’s rights 
with the state’s legitimate interest in finality by requiring: (1) that the 
state not have the burden of disproving new evidence discovered long 
after a conviction because (2) the petitioner is presumed guilty and 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317; see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 50 and 108–10. 
 159. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“When a defendant seeks to challenge the 
determination of guilt after he has been validly convicted and sentenced, it is fair to place on him the 
burden of proving his innocence . . . . [A] court should take all evidence into account . . . .”).  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 444 (1993).  
 162. Id.   
 163. One commentator has noted that since Herrera, at least 173 freestanding innocence claims have 
been filed in federal habeas courts. See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of 
Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 131 (2005). However, courts have applied different 
standards and possibilities of relief. Id. at 140–44. Of the 173 cases, courts that gave no consideration to 
the merits denied 91 habeas petitions. Id. at 134. In every circuit except the Third, 33 were denied by 
courts that assumed arguendo that the claim could exist. Id. at 135–36. In the 54 remaining cases, courts 
held that the claim was cognizable, but no petitioner met the evidentiary burden. Id. at 136.      
 164. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 438–39 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)).  
 165. Id. at 439; see also Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims 
After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 497–98 (1998) (noting that the Herrera dissenters 
voiced difficulty reconciling the majority’s focus on fact-based inquiries into a petitioner’s guilt or 
innocence).     
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 16
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss2/16
2011] FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LAW AFTER IN RE DAVIS  
 
467
bears the burden to prove innocence (3) when the original trial, 
conviction, and sentence contain no constitutional errors.166  
2.  Clear and Convincing Proof that Evidence Establishes 
Petitioner’s Innocence  
The language of In re Davis, however, provides that the district 
court must determine whether evidence “that could not have been 
obtained at the time of the trial clearly establishes petitioner’s 
innocence.”167  
In addition to the Davis language, asserting that the Court intended 
clear and convincing proof invites an examination of three relevant 
indicators. First, assuming that the words in a four-sentence decision 
were chosen carefully, “clearly” refers to the “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden found in many provisions of the AEDPA.168 
Section 2254(e)(1) provides that once a petitioner is granted an 
evidentiary hearing, “factual issue[s] made by a State court shall be 
presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of 
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence.”169 Second, in the Court’s recent opinion of House v. Bell, 
the majority stated in dicta that a Herrera claim would “require[] 
more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup” to undermine the 
reliability of the trial verdict.170 In cases where a prisoner includes a 
Schlup claim in his first habeas petition, as the House petitioner did, 
the Court requires a “more likely than not” burden for defaulted 
claims to be considered.171 Establishing a higher “clear and 
convincing” burden for a freestanding innocence claim, therefore, is 
consistent with the Court’s language because the prisoner cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-43.   
 167. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 168. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (2006); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 826 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(citing the AEDPA to hold that “we cannot honestly say that Davis can establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that a jury would not have found him guilty of Officer MacPhail’s murder”) 
(emphasis added).   
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 170. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 171. Id.  
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allege any trial error.172 Lastly, Herrera states that the hypothetical 
threshold showing would require “extraordinarily high” 
circumstances to trigger the petitioner’s right to an evidentiary 
hearing.173 If the threshold showing is high, the prisoner’s evidentiary 
burden at the hearing would presumably be at least as high, thus also 
consistent with the language of In re Davis.174 Indeed, “clear and 
convincing” proof is exactly the burden that Judge Moore found to be 
required by Mr. Davis to prove his innocence. 
These “clearly” considerations can be displayed as (1) the 
extraordinary circumstances necessary for the right to an evidentiary 
hearing, (2) the language from In re Davis, (3) Section 2254 of the 
AEDPA, and (4) the Court’s existing actual innocence analysis that 
focuses on verdict reliability. Combining them reveals a burden of 
proof very different from Justice Blackmun’s proposal: the petitioner 
must establish that new evidence clearly and convincingly shows that 
no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.175  
In this model, the innocence evidence is balanced against a 
presumptively correct verdict rendered after a “full and fair trial”176 
to determine its likely effect on a reasonable juror.177 Considering the 
prevailing judicial attitude towards Mr. Davis’s innocence evidence 
is one that regards it as inherently unreliable,178 any review of actual 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.   
 173. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (majority opinion).    
 174. Compare id., with In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating 
that no court has reviewed Mr. Davis’s claim to determine if it would satisfy a “truly persuasive” 
showing of actual innocence (citing In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting))).   
 175. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that to establish “by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for the fact that the applicant was actually innocent, no reasonable fact-
finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense” is not cognizable under current 
law) (emphasis omitted). This proposed burden is similar to what the Eleventh Circuit contemplated as 
the burden to grant an evidentiary hearing in successive petitions with stand-alone innocence claims. Id. 
However, the court found that the statutory language of § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) demanded an additional 
constitutional claim. Id.      
 176. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 177. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.  
 178. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 825–27 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit reviewed Mr. 
Davis’s recanting witness affidavits and stated that “[f]or starters, we repeatedly have noted that 
‘recantations are viewed with extreme suspicion by the courts.’” Id. at 825 (citing United States v. 
Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1988)). The Georgia Supreme Court, which based its denial of 
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innocence claims under current law directly challenges the possibility 
that innocence can ever be “clearly” determined.179 
C.  Recanting Eyewitness Testimony  
1.  Why so Much Skepticism?  
Given that our post-Herrera DNA era likely factored into the 
Davis Court’s order, it is ironic that evidence viewed with “extreme 
suspicion” must be relied on to prove actual innocence.180 Even in its 
affidavit form, Mr. Davis’s new innocence evidence divided 
members of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the 
Georgia Supreme Court.181 Is there any evidentiary value to 
eyewitness recantations? For very legitimate reasons, courts have 
traditionally held skeptical views of recanted eyewitness 
testimony.182 It is seen as unreliable and untrustworthy because of the 
notion that “a witness . . . has either lied under oath or . . . is wasting 
a court’s time by lying after trial,” which can make credibility 
determinations virtually impossible.183  
Many state courts make determinations about the reliability of 
recanting witnesses by using the test developed in Georgia according 
                                                                                                                 
Mr. Davis’s new trial on how a jury would act with the new evidence, began its discussion by noting the 
inherent unreliability of witness recantations. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 358 (2008). Justice Scalia 
notes in Davis that the same “stale” evidence is “shunt[ed] off to be examined” by the district court. In 
re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 179. Berg, supra note 163, at 141–43 (noting that the review of bare innocence claims since Herrera 
shows that the petitioner’s burden is virtually insurmountable, and even with affirmative DNA evidence, 
it may not be enough).  
 180. See cases cited supra note 178 and accompanying text. One of the most disturbing lessons 
learned from DNA is that initial eyewitness identifications are fragile, subject to suggestion, and not as 
reliable as once thought, and yet courts continue to dismiss evidence if the eyewitness recants. See 
Armbrust, supra note 146, at 77–78.    
 181. See cases cited supra note 178 and accompanying text.   
 182. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 82 (discussing the reasons that courts have skeptical views as to 
untrustworthiness of the witness, other findings in the record that support guilt, fears that witness has 
recanted due to duress or coercion, close relationships between witness and defendant, desire for 
finality, and fear of court manipulation).    
 183. Id. at 83; see also Christopher J. Sinnott, Note, When Defendant Becomes the Victim: A Child’s 
Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 569, 574–75 (1993) (stating that 
judicial skepticism “has become so universal that it appears to have given rise to an inference that 
recantation evidence is not trustworthy and should be treated as such absent the movant’s ability to 
persuade otherwise”).   
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to Berry v. State.184 The most crucial element of the Berry test is 
whether “[the evidence] is so material that it would probably produce 
a different verdict, if the new trial were granted.”185 However, 
meeting the materiality requirement is difficult because the 
probability of a different outcome “is mitigated by requiring that the 
judge be persuaded of the recantation’s truthfulness.”186 Although the 
Georgia Supreme Court denied Troy Davis’s extraordinary motion 
for new trial under the procedural requirements of this standard,187 
Chief Justice Sears dissented and warned against a categorical 
rejection of eyewitness recantations:  
We have noted that recantations by trial witnesses are inherently 
suspect, because there is almost always more reason to credit 
trial testimony over later recantations. However, it is unwise and 
unnecessary to make a categorical rule that recantations may 
never be considered in support of an extraordinary motion for 
new trial. The majority cites case law stating that recantations 
may be considered only if the recanting witness’s trial testimony 
is shown to be the “purest fabrication.” . . . [H]owever, it should 
not be corrupted into a categorical rule that new evidence in the 
form of recanted testimony can never be considered, no matter 
how trustworthy it might appear. If recantation testimony, either 
alone or supported by other evidence, shows convincingly that 
prior trial testimony was false, it simply defies all logic and 
morality to hold that it must be disregarded categorically.188  
                                                                                                                 
 184. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 81 (citing Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851)). 
 185. Berry, 10 Ga. at 527.  
 186. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 82 (citing Berry, 10 Ga. at 527) (emphasis added).  
 187. See Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 358 (2008) (stating that the procedural requirements for a 
new trial include whether new evidence is “so material that it would probably produce a different 
verdict” (citing Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 795–96 (1980))).  
 188. Id. at 363–64 (Sears, C.J., dissenting).  
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2.  Challenging the Value Given to Eyewitness Recantation 
Evidence   
Commentator Shawn Armbrust’s research of DNA exoneration 
cases and post-trial eyewitness recantations reveals challenging 
information for Georgia and federal courts to consider.189 Through 
his examination of why courts got it wrong, Armbrust discovered that 
witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, and judges all play a 
supporting role.190 Witnesses not only lie out of guilt or to help 
defendants as originally perceived but also because police and 
prosecutors may unknowingly place them under duress or coercion to 
achieve their own desired case outcomes.191 Judges are also subject to 
bias against recanting witnesses, which often results in credibility 
determinations based on witness demeanor rather than the accuracy 
of what is said.192 Furthermore, reviewing courts may unfairly give 
deference to unreasonable lower court judgments due to the pressure 
of ending cases, anxiety over concerns for the victim, and worry over 
the efficient use of the court’s limited resources.193 Coupled with 
what another commentator refers to as “status quo bias,” judges may 
unknowingly weigh the witness’s new testimony against an already 
established belief in the validity of the prior testimony.194 
Cumulatively, these results can be devastating to the lives of wrongly 
convicted defendants and do little to uncover the truth.195 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See generally Armbrust, supra note 146.  
 190. Id. at 91–97.  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 97–98.  
 193. Id. at 86, 88–91.  
 194. Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly 
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 701–02 (2005) (defining status 
quo bias as the idea that fact-finders have a cognitive reluctance to deviate from a prior court decision).  
 195. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 75–77 (citing People v. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d 718, 719–22 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1987)). The very first DNA exoneration in the United States resulted from a judge’s disbelief in the 
testimony of a recanting witness. Id. In that case, the victim-witness accused Gary Dotson, an innocent 
man, of attacking and raping her in 1977. Id. Dotson spent twelve years in prison before the victim came 
forward to say that she lied out of fear that she was pregnant. Id. At the rehearing, the judge refused to 
believe the witness’s new testimony, finding that her original testimony was more credible. Id. DNA 
evidence later proved that her recanting statements were true. Id. In another case, a judge believed a 
recanting witness to be unreliable because she hesitated in her new deposition, which resulted in the 
witness’s uncle remaining in jail for murdering his mother-in-law and raping his six-year-old niece. Id. 
DNA evidence later exonerated him also. Id. at 97 (citing State v. Elkins, No. 21380, 2003 Ohio App. 
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To avoid these undesired outcomes, Armbrust proposes that state 
courts should reject Georgia’s Berry test in favor of one similar to the 
test used by Wisconsin state courts.196 Additionally, because many 
states still rely on some formulation of Berry, his proposal calls on 
reviewing courts to “not apply a deferential standard of review to 
summary denial of motions for new trials based on recantations.”197 
Most post-conviction evidentiary hearings do not have the added 
“truth” benefit of DNA evidence;198 thus, his proposal attempts to 
balance the legitimate skepticism towards eyewitness recantations 
with the modern knowledge gained from wrongful convictions.199 It 
rejects Berry’s total reliance on “truth” in determining whether the 
requested relief should be granted because “absolute truth of the 
recantation or absolute falsity of the trial testimony” is virtually 
impossible in many cases; judges inevitably rely on subjective 
reasons for making their decisions.200 Instead, the Wisconsin test 
“requires the defendant to corroborate the recantation with other 
newly discovered evidence.”201 The “newly discovered evidence” 
requirement does not actually require new physical evidence; it is met 
when “there is a feasible motive for the initial false statement” and 
“circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the 
recantation.”202  
Under this proposed standard, the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
disregard for Troy Davis’s eyewitness recantation evidence is very 
troublesome. In the hours after Officer MacPhail’s death, Redd 
Coles—the man Mr. Davis alleges is the real gunman—approached 
                                                                                                                 
LEXIS 4037, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003)).   
 196. Id. at 98–102.  
 197. Id. at 99. 
 198. Id. at 77–78 (citing Medwed, supra note 194, at 715–18).  
 199. Id. at 98.  
 200. Id. at 99.  
 201. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 100 (citing State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (Wis. 
1997)).  
 202. Id. at 101 (citing State v. Kivioja, 592 N.W.2d 220, 232 (Wis. 1999)). Armbrust notes that in 
Kivioja, the court lists non-exhaustive considerations such as “the extent to which the statement is self-
incriminatory . . . and the declarant’s availability to testify under oath and subject to cross examination.” 
Id. However, Ambrust’s research indicates that courts should also consider whether the original 
testimony was incentivized in some way, the extent to which the witness may have been coerced or 
influenced, and whether law enforcement may have somehow affected the original testimony. Id.  
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the police with an attorney and accused Troy Davis of the murder.203 
Subsequently, Troy Davis’s picture was posted on the Savannah 
nightly news and in the daily newspaper for five days before any 
witness was shown photos of suspects.204 On the same day police 
discovered that Coles was carrying a .38 caliber the night of the 
murder, he was permitted to play the role of a bystander in a shooting 
reenactment along with three of the State’s witnesses.205 Upon 
hearing the witnesses’ descriptions of the killer’s clothing, Coles 
confessed to police that he was wearing a yellow shirt on the night of 
the murder, but he told them he gave it to Mr. Davis to wear.206 With 
the exception of Coles, the only remaining non-recanting witness told 
police just hours after the shooting that he would only be able to 
recognize the killer by his clothing.207  
In her affidavit, one witness stated that she felt pressured by police 
because she was on parole, and she was only shown one photo: Mr. 
Davis’s.208 Another witness, who was sixteen-years-old at the time, 
stated in his affidavit that police threatened him with jail time if he 
refused to go along with Coles’s description of events.209 A jailhouse 
informant completely recanted his testimony by stating, “I made 
[Troy’s] confession up from information I had heard on TV.”210 Even 
Larry Young, the victim Officer MacPhail ran out to save, admitted 
to being intoxicated on the night of the murder, which helps explain 
why he has had difficulty remembering what happened that night.211 
The record contains episodes of police bias, questionable 
identification procedures, witness duress and coercion, and new 
evidence never reviewed until the June 2010 evidentiary hearing.212 
Despite so much uncertainty, however, one fact is clear: Mr. Davis 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3.  
 204. Id. at 4.  
 205. Id. at 4–5.  
 206. Id. at 5.  
 207. Id. at 5, 8.  
 208. Id. at 5.   
 209. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6.  
 210. Id. at 7.  
 211. Id. at 6.  
 212. See generally id.   
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was tried and convicted in a constitutionally “fair” proceeding.213 
Even though the truth may not ever be discoverable, federal law 
demands an unyielding deference to this original verdict.214  
D.  Actual Innocence or Actual Unfairness: Searching for a 
Meaningful Review of Innocence    
Under the current scheme of habeas corpus law, the original guilty 
verdict returned in Troy Davis’s case gains a stronger presumption of 
correctness the more the opportunity for judicial review is denied. As 
a result, the district court must give substantial deference to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, which arrived at its own decision by giving 
substantial deference to the original trial verdict. Furthermore, the 
validity of the original trial is irrefutable because Mr. Davis’s claims 
of ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct were denied in 
his first habeas petition.215  
1.  Federalism, Finality, and the South 
Supporters of restrictive federal habeas laws point to the vast 
majority of actually guilty criminals clogging courts with 
unmeritorious claims.216 If federal courts are to maintain a review 
power with integrity, they argue, stricter laws ensure that only the 
most compelling constitutional claims have federal access.217 Thus, 
individual rights are protected and states rightly maintain the 
responsibility for providing avenues of relief for their prisoners.218 
Scholars point out that the “issue[] of guilt and innocence is indeed 
one of the primary purposes of the state trial courts” and that “federal 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993).    
 214. See discussion supra Parts I.A.2, I.C. 
 215. See discussion supra Part I.D. The role of executive clemency is beyond the scope of this Note. 
However, for an evaluation of the failures of executive clemency in actual innocence claims see Berg, 
supra note 163, at 144–48.  
 216. Anderson, supra note 165, at 498. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id.    
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courts have . . . limited expertise in the definition of state offenses 
and . . . procedural and evidentiary law.”219  
After the Court’s Herrera decision, some states did respond by 
adopting reforms to allow actual innocence claims in state court 
forums.220 Recently, in November 2009, members of the New York 
Senate submitted an actual innocence bill for debate.221 If passed, the 
law will be groundbreaking because it gives judges the ability “to 
overlook procedural errors in a defendant’s case” based on the 
evidence before them.222 While such efforts are laudable and directly 
speak to the types of barriers encountered by petitioners like Mr. 
Davis, New York has not executed a prisoner since 1976. That same 
year, the Supreme Court noted that “death is different in kind from 
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal 
justice.”223  
In fact, executions today are mainly a Southern phenomenon. 
Since the Supreme Court lifted the moratorium on executions in 
1976, 80% of all executions have taken place in the South.224 In 2008 
alone, 95% of all executions were carried out by southern states.225 
Although Texas accounts for half of the 2008 total,226 84% of its 
wrongful convictions are due to eyewitness misidentifications.227 
Despite such an alarming trend, the state legislature continues to fail 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 499 (citing Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-
Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1009 (1994)). 
 220. See generally id. (citing Connecticut, Texas, and Illinois actual innocence reforms in the wake of 
the Herrera decision).  
 221. S.B. 6234, 232d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).   
 222. John Eligon, Hope for the Wrongfully Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A23.  
 223. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); 
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter DPIC FACTS].   
 224. DPIC FACTS, supra note 223 (citing the number of executions in each southern state: Texas, 463; 
Virginia, 107; Florida, 69; North Carolina, 43; Georgia, 47; South Carolina, 42; Alabama, 48; Louisiana, 
28; Arkansas, 27; Mississippi, 13; and Tennessee, 6).   
 225.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2008: YEAR END REPORT 
(2008), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2008YearEnd.pdf [hereinafter DPIC Year End Report].  
 226. Id. 
 227. Desiree Evans, Texas Justice: Where Wrongful Convictions are the Norm, FACING SOUTH (The 
Institute for Southern Studies), Sept. 1, 2009, http://southernstudies.org/2009/09/texas-wrongful-
convictions.html. 
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in its attempts to address this problem.228 Georgia executions are 
nowhere near the Texas rate, but misidentifications are also the 
number one cause of wrongful convictions.229 Georgia has no actual 
innocence laws or state-wide uniform eyewitness identification 
procedures. Meanwhile, police departments across the state continue 
to train officers under varying standards, which results in a much 
higher likelihood of eyewitness “contamination.”230  
Like Georgia, most states require wrongful conviction claims to be 
based on either constitutional violations or newly discovered 
evidence.231 As shown in Davis v. State, however, the Georgia 
Supreme Court relied on the old axiom that witness recantations must 
evidence “the purest fabrication” to be considered reliable rather than 
seeking guidance from the factual contexts of the original and 
recanting testimony.232 If a state uses antiquated procedural 
reviewing methods to make a decision about an original verdict that 
was itself obtained through questionable means, then a wrongful 
conviction claim fails to provide proper protections to prisoners. 
Coupled with the “hefty procedural rules”233 of the AEDPA, the 
verdict and the state reviewing decision are presumed correct in a 
federal court without regard to the varying standards used by 
different states.234 In his comments about the inflexibility of the 
AEDPA, one scholar has noted that “[t]here are huge disparities in 
what states do to . . . ensure fair and reliable review in state court 
cases . . . . Many states have effectively opted not to provide the kind 
of review that the AEDPA assumes when it requires federal judges to 
defer to state court rulings and findings.”235   
                                                                                                                 
 228. See DPIC FACTS, supra note 223 (showing Texas executed twenty-three people in 2009, with the 
next closest being Virginia with three). 
 229. See supra notes 142 and 147 and accompanying text.  
 230. Terzano, supra note 147. 
 231. Eligon, supra note 222. 
 232. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 363–64 (2008) (Sears, C.J., dissenting); see also supra text 
accompanying note 188.   
 233. Eligon, supra note 222; see also discussion supra Parts I.C, II.B.2.  
 234. Stevenson, supra note 135, at 359–60.  
 235. Id.  
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2.  Granting Habeas Relief on an Actual Innocence Claim: 
Constitutional Principle, Procedural Anomaly, or Both? 
Even if the district court had been persuaded by the recanting 
testimony and new evidence at the evidentiary hearing, it remains 
unclear how Mr. Davis could have received relief. The Supreme 
Court has never held that a stand-alone innocence claim provides the 
constitutional basis for alleging that a state acted in violation of 
“clearly established federal law.”236 According to Justice Scalia, In re 
Davis is a “fool’s errand”237 because the district court’s only options 
were to comply with the current law and deny the requested relief, or 
act outside the law and risk having any determination overturned.238 
In Davis, Justice Stevens provides two explanations for how a 
district court might consider actual innocence relief. The first is a 
procedural sleight of hand. He notes that Mr. Davis’s case is 
“sufficiently ‘exceptional’” to use the Court’s “original habeas 
jurisdiction,” and Justice Scalia also acknowledges that the Court 
“takes the extraordinary step . . . of instructing a district court to 
adjudicate . . . an original writ of habeas corpus.”239 Once correctly 
viewed as “original,” a relief possibility exists based on the Court’s 
decision in Felker v. Turpin, which questioned AEDPA applicability 
to original habeas petitions, specifically § 2254(d)(1).240 Justice 
Stevens uses Felker to support his assertion that the district court 
“may conclude that § 2254(d)(1) does not apply . . . to an original 
habeas petition” and grant relief to a petitioner with a freestanding 
actual innocence claim.241  
Justice Stevens’s second relief argument, however, is based more 
on constitutional principle. He states that the district court may find 
                                                                                                                 
 236. 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993); discussion 
supra Parts II.A–B.    
 237. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 238. Id. (“Sending [the actual innocence claim] to a district court that ‘might’ be authorized to provide 
relief, but then again ‘might’ be reversed if it did so, is not a sensible way to proceed.”). 
 239. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1–2.   
 240. See supra notes 98–104 and 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 241. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Stevens, J. concurring). But see id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting the many cases where the Court has reversed lower court decisions for failing to apply 
§ 2254(d)(1)). 
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that § 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional if it sanctions the execution of an 
actually innocent prisoner.242 Although the district court agreed that 
such action would be unconstitutional, it is unclear whether Judge 
Moore’s opinion struck the proper balance in light of the demanding 
statutory deference given to the fact-findings of the Georgia courts.  
Commentators note that restricting habeas relief to questions of 
verdict accuracy “has proven to be one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks for capital defendants in their attempts to present such claims 
for relief.”243 Under current law, state judgments are given highly 
deferential treatment even though DNA exonerations have exposed 
“failures of trial counsel and suppression by the state of exculpatory 
evidence [as] two of the primary causes of the conviction and 
sentencing to death of innocent people.”244 In criticizing this 
deferential treatment, another commentator has recommended that 
federal courts should not automatically confer a presumption of 
correctness, but instead, states should earn it by explicitly listing the 
reasons for their decisions.245 In Sawyer v. Whitley, Justice Blackmun 
also criticized the Court for embracing verdict accuracy at the 
expense of individual constitutional rights:  
[T]he Court’s focus on factual innocence is inconsistent with 
Congress’ grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . . [F]ederal 
courts are instructed to entertain petitions from state prisoners 
who allege that they are held ‘in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’ . . . [T]he 
focus on innocence assumes, erroneously, that the only value 
worth protecting through federal habeas review is the accuracy 
and reliability of the guilt determination. But our criminal justice 
system . . . our Constitution, protect[s] other values in addition to 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Id. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
 243. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 613.  
 244. Id.  
 245. Abigail L. Kite, Note, The Fact-Finding Process Review Model: Remedying Fact-Based 
Constitutional Challenges on Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 351, 389 
(2008–2009) (“Although federal law commands that the habeas court give great deference to a factual 
finding made by a state court, that deference should be reasonable. The habeas court should . . . 
consider[] the reasons that led to the state court’s ultimate conclusion.”). 
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the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination . . . . The 
. . . system of justice adopted by the Founders affords a 
defendant certain process-based protections that do not have 
accuracy of truth finding as their primary goal. These protections 
. . . including . . . the Eighth Amendment right against the 
imposition of an arbitrary and capricious sentence . . . ha[s] been 
systematically excluded . . . [is] debased, and indeed, rendered 
largely irrelevant, in a system that values the accuracy of the 
guilt determination above individual rights.246 
III.  ACTUAL INNOCENCE PROPOSAL 
A.  Actual Innocence Should Be a Substantive Claim 
1.  Executing an Innocent Defendant Violates the Constitution 
The majority in Herrera assumed for the sake of argument that a 
truly persuasive showing of actual innocence would “render the 
execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant habeas 
relief.”247 In separate opinions, however, a majority of five of the 
Court’s justices explicitly stated that such an action would be 
unconstitutional.248 Justice O’Connor joined by Justice Kennedy 
stated: “[T]he execution of a legally and factually innocent person 
would be a constitutionally intolerable event.”249 Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, stated in a vehement dissent: 
“We really are being asked . . . whether the Constitution forbids the 
execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced 
but . . . can [later] prove his innocence . . . . I do not see how the 
answer can be anything but ‘yes.’”250 Despite what should seemingly 
be a foregone conclusion, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the 
individual states should unequivocally acknowledge that executing an 
innocent person is the most “purposeless and needless imposition of 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 355–56 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).   
 247. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). 
 248. See id. at 419–31. 
 249. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 250. Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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pain and suffering”251 that could be forced on an individual. To even 
ask the question speaks to the most basic and fundamental retributive 
gap imaginable; an answer in the negative impeaches the validity of 
the Constitution and our entire concept of morality.   
However challenging an acceptance of this basic constitutional 
premise may be to the nature of federal-state relations, this proposal 
suggests that the practical effects of recognizing substantive 
innocence claims will not damage the integrity of this balance. To the 
contrary, by limiting the availability of freestanding actual innocence 
claims to death-sentenced petitioners, the Court would provide 
incentives to help strengthen the validity of the entire criminal justice 
system. 
2.  Recognizing Actual Innocence Protects the Rights of 
Individuals and Restores Integrity to the Criminal Justice System 
The essential purpose of any criminal justice system is to convict 
and punish the guilty. When the system is flawed, innocents are 
undeservedly punished, the guilty receive no retribution from society, 
and criminal activity is not effectively deterred.252 If the larger 
society is made aware of these flaws, however, an entire system of 
justice is challenged.253  
Undoubtedly, DNA exonerations have had the greatest public 
impact on criminal justice in our lifetime.254 Every wrongful 
conviction made public through DNA evidence, or any other means, 
casts doubt upon the system’s fairness, but exonerations also create 
challenging opportunities to restore public faith in the safeguards 
aimed at protecting the innocent.255 When these challenges are 
answered, as many jurisdictions have done, it can lead to statutory 
reform in areas such as eyewitness identification procedure, crime lab 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).  
 252. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 596.  
 253. Id. at 588.  
 254. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 77.  
 255. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 592 (discussing that the Supreme Court battled the 
public knowledge of the arbitrary and inequitable imposition of the death penalty in the 1960s by 
limiting the discretion given to states and prosecutors).   
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protocol, and post-conviction DNA access for defendants.256 If the 
knowledge gained from DNA exonerations is ignored, however, it 
can eventually result in “consequences not only for society’s effort to 
prevent crime and achieve justice, but also for the capacity of 
government to be successful in other areas of social policy.”257 
Unfortunately, many states that impose the death penalty have failed 
to adequately address these issues, both legislatively and in the 
courtroom. On the federal level, Congress, through the AEDPA, has 
exacerbated this problem by maximizing the level of deference given 
to state court judgments in all cases.   
Federal courts, through the writ of habeas corpus, have been given 
the duty and ability to free those held “in violation of the 
constitution,”258 ensuring both due process for the accused and 
punishments that are not “cruel and unusual.”259 Because the 
Supreme Court has held that the death penalty will receive a 
heightened level of scrutiny and review,260 and because the standard 
defining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual evolves 
according to society’s standards of decency,261 no potentially 
innocent death row prisoner should be denied a fair opportunity to 
present a colorable claim of actual innocence in federal court. 
Allowing this access fully acknowledges the reality that innocent 
people are convicted of crimes at a greater rate than ever thought 
possible, despite the protections of “full and fair trials.”262 Allowing 
the actual innocence petitioner to have his claim reviewed fulfills the 
Court’s death penalty promise, it reflects the growing societal 
concern over wrongful convictions, and it incentivizes states to adopt 
reforms that will ensure greater accuracy in guilt determinations. The 
Court should therefore hold that a capital defendant maintains a right 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 257. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 596.  
 258. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1863–1867). 
 259. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV. 
 260. Stevenson, supra note 135, at 362 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).  
 261. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).  
 262. Since 1973, 138 people have been released from death row due to evidence of their innocence. 
DPIC FACTS, supra note 223. In the last seven years there have been an average of five exonerations per 
year, and over one thousand defendants have been sentenced to death during the same period. Id.   
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to raise a habeas corpus claim based solely on newly discovered 
innocence evidence because executing an innocent person is 
unconstitutional.263  
B.  The Standard of Review for Actual Innocence Claims Should Be 
Fair to All Parties    
Justice Blackmun’s “probably is innocent” proposal in Herrera v. 
Collins provides the only justifiable framework for federal courts to 
use when considering substantive actual innocence claims on the 
merits.264 Under the current actual innocence doctrine as defined in 
Schlup, a petitioner can overcome the procedural default rule and be 
granted an evidentiary hearing by showing that new evidence proves 
that a reasonable juror would have “more likely than not” found him 
innocent. By analogy, the petitioner with a freestanding actual 
innocence claim should also have to present evidence compelling 
enough to overcome the default rule; however, given the wealth of 
data that exonerations have revealed about “valid” trials, relief on the 
merits of a freestanding innocence claim should be granted where the 
petitioner can prove he “probably is innocent.” 
1.  Placing a “Probably is Innocent” Burden on the Petitioner 
Properly Rejects Verdict Accuracy Determinations  
It is the actual innocence of the defendant, rather than his ability to 
allege constitutional errors from trial, that makes his execution 
unconstitutional.265 Thus, this proposal rejects substantive actual 
innocence determinations based upon the so-called “verdict 
accuracy” model.  
As exemplified by Troy Davis’s case, the need to recognize 
substantive actual innocence claims arises from the Court’s very 
narrow definition and use of innocence. As Justice Stevens noted, it 
is quite possible under current law for a truly innocent petitioner to be 
                                                                                                                 
 263. This proposal is based upon Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Herrera. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 430–46 (1992).   
 264. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
 265. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 831 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).  
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executed.266 Although the Supreme Court intervened in Mr. Davis’s 
case and granted the requested hearing, he is forced to concede a full 
and fair trial because his other constitutional claims were previously 
denied or barred. Combined with the AEDPA requirement that state 
court decisions be considered presumptively correct, weighing 
innocence evidence against that verdict to determine how reasonable 
jurors would act completely disregards whether the state judgment 
“[was] obtained . . . through fundamentally fair procedures” and 
misunderstands the nature of the constitutional claim.267 Indeed, 
under the verdict accuracy approach to habeas relief, newly obtained 
innocence evidence merely allows petitioners to challenge the 
reliability of the trial process.268 Thus, petitioners with substantive 
innocence claims, who cannot allege trial error, would be required to 
clearly and convincingly prove their innocence so that the accuracy 
of the verdict is sufficiently undermined. The flaw in such an inquiry 
is readily apparent: those adjudged as “probably innocent” would 
presumably have their claims denied and death sentences upheld, a 
result dangerously close to deliberate murder.    
By its nature, a “freestanding actual innocence” claim differs 
substantially from the Court’s current understanding and use of actual 
innocence. Most importantly, a freestanding claim is not solely raised 
to undermine the reliability of the process that led to the guilty 
verdict, nor is it concerned with bolstering the validity of other 
process based constitutional claims of trial error. Indeed, the Court 
dismisses the science behind wrongful convictions and unjustly 
forecloses avenues of habeas relief when the constitutional definition 
of a fair trial is inextricably linked to a determination of verdict 
reliability. Any legitimate treatment of substantive innocence claims 
must recognize, for example, that a minimally “fair” trial does not 
always produce presumptively accurate results, especially where new 
evidence proving innocence was previously unobtainable.  
                                                                                                                 
 266. See discussion supra Part I.D.   
 267. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 
discussion supra Part II.C.2.  
 268. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).   
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Under this proposal, the habeas court is simply required to 
consider whether the petitioner’s new evidence proves that he 
probably is innocent. In so doing, “it is not necessary or appropriate 
[for a judge] to make further presumptions about the reliability of 
newly discovered evidence” because how a reasonable juror would 
have considered the new evidence in the original trial is irrelevant.269 
Moreover, individual review ensures proper judicial flexibility in 
defining whether the burden of proof is met because in each case “the 
stronger the evidence of . . . guilt, the more persuasive the newly 
discovered evidence must be”270 to receive relief.     
2.  Placing the Burden on the Petitioner is Fair to the State 
Punishing convicted defendants is a legitimate state and societal 
interest.271 By acting as independent sovereigns, states also maintain 
a substantial interest in judgment finality.272 Accordingly, the actually 
innocent petitioner must bear the burden to prove innocence at an 
evidentiary hearing out of deference to the state and respect for the 
jury’s verdict. The original judgment and those made by state courts 
in later proceedings, however, should not automatically create a rigid 
presumption of correctness.273 Instead, federal review must be 
thorough and meaningful, which includes an acknowledgement that 
the petitioner has passed the Schlup gateway stage. Under this 
“probably is innocent” proposal, habeas courts would be required to 
“weigh the evidence in favor of the prisoner against the evidence of 
his guilt” on a case-by-case basis274 recognizing that state judgments 
should be afforded presumptive correctness when it is deserved.275 If 
necessary, federal habeas courts should even consider when state 
disparities in public funding for indigent defense, eyewitness 
identification standards, and state post-conviction procedures factor 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 443–44 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 270. Id.  
 271. Anderson, supra note165, at 499–500.  
 272. Id.  
 273. See supra notes 238–46 and accompanying text. 
 274. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 443 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 275. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
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into their review of claims.276 A district court presented with 
innocence evidence in the form of recanting testimony, for example, 
might give a Wisconsin judgment higher deference than a Georgia 
judgment because of the different standards used in making reliability 
determinations.277 In all cases, however, habeas courts should 
consider the reasons that states arrive at fact-findings to ensure a 
meaningful review of the innocence claim.278   
C.  The Effect of Actual Innocence Claims on the Criminal Justice 
System 
1.  Judicial Economy 
Striking the proper balance between the Court’s interest in judicial 
economy and the actually innocent petitioner’s interest in federal 
review is achieved simply by recognizing the claim. For example, in 
the last two decades, death sentencing has steadily decreased in the 
United States from a high of 328 cases in 1994 to 111 in 2008.279 
Furthermore, the latest statistics from the year 2000 show that of the 
21,086 habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal 
courts, only 259 of those involved prisoners sentenced to death.280 
Currently, only 10% of prisoners with death sentences file habeas 
petitions claiming actual innocence.281 Of that 10%, very few meet 
Schlup’s “probable” gateway requirement, and an even smaller 
number later result in findings of constitutional error sufficient to 
overturn a verdict.282 Thus, the actual number of innocence 
evidentiary hearings would be nominal.  
                                                                                                                 
 276. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 46, at 613 (discussing that any fairness afforded to capital 
defendants has given way to habeas relief only when the claimed harm affects the “accuracy of [trial] 
outcomes”); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(stating that where the petitioner can show injury, the government should bear the burden of showing 
that it was harmless to the verdict, not the other way around). 
 277. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.  
 278. See generally Kite, supra note 245.  
 279. DPIC FACTS, supra note 223. Death sentences have been in steady decline since 1999. 
 280. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (BJS), SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER 
PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 (2002).  
 281. Rodriguez & Atlas, supra note 25, at 41.   
 282. Id.  
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AEDPA was intended to decrease the burden on federal courts and 
expedite state interests in finality, but the Act has actually had the 
opposite effect.283 Government data shows that habeas filings 
increased at a higher rate than normal in the years following the Act’s 
passage,284 despite higher review standards and more stringent 
procedural bar rules. Thus, any perceived additional burden on the 
judiciary created by substantive actual innocence claims is 
unfounded. One commentator has also noted that “federal judges 
retain great authority to dismiss summarily insufficient pleadings, 
grant state motions for summary judgment, and deny and even bar 
. . . filings from prisoners who abuse the process.”285 Lastly, no 
special procedural treatment is required for this new claim because 
“[i]f a petitioner can show that he is entitled to relief on the merits of 
his actual-innocence claim . . . he certainly can show that [it] falls 
within the ‘actual-innocence’ exception” to the procedural default 
rule.286 
2.  States Should Take the Lead by Passing Actual Innocence Laws 
and Adopting Reforms Based on the Lessons of DNA 
The potential federal interference in state court criminal judgments 
provides substantial justification for states to pass their own criminal 
procedure reforms and actual innocence laws. The state trial is the 
definitive process for guilt determinations, and federal courts have 
limited knowledge of state processes.287 Therefore, “[i]f states 
provide their own methods for review, they can improve the prospect 
of attaining finality in criminal cases by maintaining control over 
their own criminal judgments, within their own systems of justice.”288   
                                                                                                                 
 283. Id.  
 284. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (BJS), SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER 
PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 (2002) (“Between April 
1996 and September 2000 an estimated 18,000 additional habeas corpus petitions were filed in U.S. 
district courts by State prison inmates as a result of the enactment of the AEDPA.”).  
 285. Stevenson, supra note 135, at 362.  
 286. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 441 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 287. Anderson, supra note 165, at 499.   
 288. Id. at 519.  
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Because the review of capital cases involves serious legal and 
moral considerations, all states with active death penalty laws should 
again reassess whether their methods of review adequately address 
the interests of defendants and the State.289 Moreover, state courts 
should be required “to do more”290 when they engage in actual 
innocence analysis. New York’s proposed actual innocence law is 
one example of state action that legitimates the reality of wrongful 
convictions. “It elevates substance over form” by dismissing unfair 
procedural rules in cases with compelling claims of actual 
innocence.291  
Accordingly, Georgia courts should also “do more” and move 
away from the procedural limitations of Berry v. State when deciding 
extraordinary motions for retrial. New research challenges the 
traditional judicial attitudes toward eyewitness recantations,292 and 
indicates that the courts’ total disregard for this form of evidence 
“obscures the truth instead of revealing it” and “los[es] sight of 
justice.”293 Instead, Georgia should adopt a workable standard like 
that of Wisconsin state courts.294 Recanting eyewitness evidence 
must be considered with regard to all of the circumstances 
surrounding the initial identifications and subsequent recants, so 
courts may gain a better understanding of its true probative value. As 
indicated by the Davis Court’s willingness to grant Troy Davis an 
evidentiary hearing, federal interference in an unreasonable state 
judgment is necessary and justified when the death penalty is 
involved.295 The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. State 
does not warrant AEDPA’s inflexible deference, and Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Id.; see discussion supra Parts II.A, II.D. 
 290. Eligon, supra note 222.  
 291. Id.  
 292. See generally Armbrust, supra note 146.   
 293. Alyson M. Palmer, Georgia Death Row Inmate Loses 11th Circuit Appeal, FULTON CO. DAILY 
REP., Apr. 20, 2009 (quoting Steven Bright, President of the Southern Center for Human Rights).  
 294. Armbrust, supra note 146, at 100 (citing State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (Wis. 
1997)); see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.  
 295. See generally In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.).   
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Sears’s dissent provides a necessary and rational view to consider 
when an individual’s life is at stake.296 
CONCLUSION 
This note has examined the policy of finality underlying the writ of 
habeas corpus and argued that more flexibility is needed to ensure 
that federal courts properly review substantive actual innocence 
claims. The current review standards imposed by the Supreme Court 
and Congress meant to free those held in violation of the Constitution 
are more stringent than ever before. And yet, the causes for wrongful 
convictions, which directly challenge many assumptions about the 
protections afforded to defendants at trial, reveal the need for 
substantial reform at both the state and federal level. The Court’s past 
refusal to directly answer the innocence question may reflect 
legitimate federalism concerns, but there are greater liberty interests 
at stake for death-sentenced actual innocence petitioners. Indeed, the 
Court’s willingness to grant Troy Davis an evidentiary hearing 
represents a major shift toward recognizing the unconstitutional 
procedural limitations of the AEDPA; however, Herrera v. Collins 
and the definition of actual innocence must be revisited before any 
subsequent hearing serves its purpose. The risk of executing an 
innocent person is too great and the legitimacy of the criminal system 
is too important for In re Davis to be nothing more than a hollow 
resolution to these challenges. The need for judgment finality should 
not come at the expense of justice.   
                                                                                                                 
 296. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 363–64 (2008) (Sears, C.J., dissenting); see supra text 
accompanying note 188. 
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